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Abstract: Some right acts have what philosophers call moral worth. A right act has moral worth 
if and only if it manifests a set of motives/concerns that makes its agent deserving of praise for 
having non-accidentally done what’s right. I argue that what makes an agent deserving of 
praise for having non-accidentally done what’s right is that her act manifests an appropriate set 
of concerns, where the appropriateness of these concerns is a function what her ultimate moral 
concerns should be. Two important upshots of the resulting account of moral worth are that (,) 
an act can have moral worth even if it doesn’t manifest a concern for doing what’s right and 
that (/) an act can lack moral worth even if it is performed for the right reasons.       
 
 
!. Moral Worth 
Some right acts have what philosophers call moral worth.1 These acts manifest the agent’s 
virtuous motives and, thereby, do her credit.2 More precisely, a right act has moral worth if and 
only if it manifests a set of motives/concerns that does its agent credit in that it makes her 
deserving of praise for having non-accidentally done what’s right. Now, not all right acts have 
moral worth. Take, for instance, Immanuel Kant’s shopkeeper (G O:-QR).3 He deals honestly 
                                                        
1 By ‘right’, I mean ‘morally right’. And I use the term broadly to include both obligatory acts and supererogatory 
acts. Note, then, that I won’t take a stand here on whether either impermissible acts or merely permissible acts (that 
is, permissible acts that are neither obligatory nor supererogatory) can have moral worth.     
2 An act manifests a set of motives/concerns if and only if we must appeal to these motives/concerns, but not to any 
others, to explain its performance.      
3 The ‘G’ stands for Kant’s Groundwork, and the citation is given by volume and page number. 
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with his customers, but only because it’s good for business. So, although he acts rightly in 
dealing honestly with his customers, these acts have no moral worth in that they were 
motivated solely out of a selfish concern to maximize profits, a concern that would have led him 
to cheat his customers had they been less savvy. Thus, his acting rightly was merely fortuitous. 
For had it not been in his self-interest to act rightly, he would have acted wrongly.   
 The moral worth of an act is a function of the virtuousness of the motives/concerns it 
manifests as opposed to the virtuousness of the character of the agent who performs it. Thus, an 
act can have moral worth even if its agent has a bad character. Consider that even a stingy miser 
might do something generous on occasion. And if, on that occasion, what moves her is an 
appropriate set of concerns, her act will have moral worth despite being out of character. 
Likewise, someone with a good character might act from bad motives on occasion, and, when 
she does, her act will lack moral worth. So, whereas the moral worth of an act depends on what 
the agent’s motives were in the given situation and whether those motives could potentially 
lead her to act wrongly in other situations, an agent’s character has to do with whether she’s 
disposed to have the appropriate concerns in a wide range of situations (even if not necessarily 
in the given situation). Thus, the stingy miser counts as having a bad character, because, in most 
situations, she’ll care too much for her own wealth and/or too li]le for the welfare of others. 
Nevertheless, it may be that she has the appropriate set of concerns and acts generously on that 
rare day in which everything goes her way: she finds her morning paper on her doorstep 
instead of in the bushes, the barista gets her order right and even spells her name correctly, the 
other commuters with whom she shares the road that morning are unusually courteous, and, 
when she arrives at work, she learns that she’s ge]ing the promotion that she’d been hoping 
for. Suppose that, on that day, she buys lunch for a homeless man out of a concern that he 
doesn’t go hungry. And this act has moral worth because it manifests an appropriate set of 
concerns (e.g., a greater concern for this man’s welfare than for squirreling away a few extra 
dollars for herself), a set of concerns that made her acting rightly in this situation non-
accidental. So, the fact that she has a bad character and wouldn’t have acted generously or have 
had the appropriate concerns if this had been anything but an exceptionally good day for her 
doesn’t detract from the moral worth of this particular act, which manifests a virtuous set of 
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concerns.    
Now, when it comes to the moral worth of an act, it’s not just the specific concerns that 
moved the agent to perform it that ma]ers; her other concerns can ma]er as well. To illustrate, 
consider the following case.  
 
The Dog-Lover: A dog-lover named Yunn protects a poodle from a boy’s kick by blocking 
his blow with her own leg. And she does so out of a concern for the dog’s welfare. Thus, 
she does the right thing for the right reasons. But suppose that, in this instance, Yunn 
had absolutely no concern for the welfare of the boy and cared only for herself and the 
dog.4 So, she would have fatally shot the boy had this been an option for her. For, in that 
case, she could have protected the dog without having to suffer his painful blow. But, as 
it was, she didn’t have this option and could protect the dog only by blocking his blow 
with her own leg. So, her acting rightly in this instance was merely accidental. Indeed, 
the same set of concerns that led her to do the right thing in this situation would have 
led her to do the wrong thing in other relevantly similar situations, such as the one in 
which she had the option of shooting the boy.5  
 
The lesson, I take it, is that we must look not only at the specific motive/concern that led 
her to act as she did, but also at her other pertinent concerns. And I’ll be assuming that a lack of 
                                                        
4 I’m claiming only that these were her concerns on this particular occasion. Thus, I’m not making any claim about 
her character or what sorts of relatively stable sets of concerns she would have across various counterfactual 
situations.   
5 Julia Markovits (/0,0, /,0) talks about a somewhat similar case. In her case, a fanatical dog-lover saves several 
strangers at great risk to herself. But, given her fanatical love for dogs, she would not have saved them had the choice 
been between saving them and saving her dog. Markovits claims that, assuming that the dog-lover’s preference for 
saving her dog over the strangers is the result of her having too much concern for her dog rather than too li]le 
concern for the strangers, her act of saving the strangers has moral worth despite the fact that her excessive concern 
for her dog would have led her to do the wrong thing in other situations. Now, I agree with Markovits on this point 
provided that we’re assuming that what interests us is whether this woman is willing to sacrifice her own interests 
for the sake of promoting the much greater interests of others. But, as I’ll argue below, there may be other contexts in 
which what interests us is whether the woman’s concern for her dog is excessive. And, in those contexts, her act 
would not count as having moral worth.        
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concern for something can count as a concern; it just counts as a “zero concern” for that thing. 
Thus, in The Dog-Lover, we must consider not only Yunn’s concern for both herself and the dog, 
but also her zero concern for the boy. For she would have been led by this set of concerns to act 
wrongly in a situation in which she had the option of shooting the boy. Thus, it was lucky that 
she didn’t have this option. And, so, we should think that an act’s moral worth depends not 
merely on the agent’s motivating reason for performing it, but on all her pertinent concerns.  
Now, for any agent in a given situation, her pertinent concerns are all and only those that 
will (or would) determine whether she acts rightly in this and other relevantly similar 
situations. Thus, in The Dog-Lover, Yunn’s zero concern for the boy’s welfare is pertinent given 
that it would have led her to act wrongly in the relevantly similar situation in which she had the 
option of shooting the boy and everything else was the same. In that situation, she would have 
acted wrongly. Thus, her acting rightly in the given situation was merely fortuitous. Likewise, if 
Yunn had had a concern for the boy but not for dogs with spots, her acting rightly would have 
counted as merely accidental. For a zero concern for dogs with spots would have led her to 
refrain from acting rightly (that is, to refrain from blocking the boy’s blow) in the relevantly 
similar situation in which the boy was about to kick a Dalmatian rather than a poodle.  
Of course, not every concern that determines whether an agent would act rightly in 
some other situation counts as pertinent. For, when it comes to pertinence, it’s only the 
relevantly similar situations that ma]er. Thus, even if Yunn had had a concern to prevent 
Muslims from immigrating to the U.S., this wouldn’t itself prevent her act of protecting the dog 
from having moral worth. Although this concern would have led her to do the wrong thing in a 
situation in which she had the opportunity to prevent a Muslim with a compelling asylum 
claim from immigrating to the U.S., this situation isn’t relevantly similar to the one at hand: one 
in which she has to choose whether to protect a dog from harm. That said, there’s no simple and 
straightforward way of spelling out what the relevantly similar situations are. We may wonder, 
then, whether a situation in which a boy is about to beat a snake with a stick is relevantly 
similar to the one described in The Dog-Lover. And, so, we may wonder: Would Yunn’s having a 
concern for the welfare of both dogs and humans but not for the welfare of snakes make her 
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acting rightly in The Dog-Lover count as merely accidental? The answers to such questions 
depend on the context in which they’re being asked and on what’s taken to be the relevant 
similarity relation in that context. Thus, we could imagine one context in which we’re concerned 
with whether Yunn is speciesist and, thus, whether she has a concern for the welfare of all 
sentient beings and not just for the welfare of her fellow mammals. And, in that case, her acting 
rightly in this situation would count as merely accidental. But we could also imagine a context 
in which we’re merely concerned with whether Yunn is sufficiently altruistic and so willing to 
sacrifice her own welfare for sake of promoting the welfare of some other being. And, in that 
case, her acting rightly in this situation would count as non-accidental.   
As I see it, this sort of contextualism is a feature rather than a bug. For one, moral worth 
has to do with whether or not an agent was just lucky to have acted rightly, and, in general, 
whether someone counts as lucky is contextually determined. Take, for instance, the person 
who becomes infected with the Ebola virus and survives. On the one hand, we might consider 
her to be rather lucky, as only one in three survive such an infection. On the other hand, we 
might consider her to be extremely unlucky, as Ebola infections are exceeding rare. For another, 
this sort of contextualism helps us to explain why there tends to be so much intractable 
disagreement about various cases in the literature about moral worth. The disagreement is 
intractable, because there’s no set answer in the abstract as to what the relevant similarity 
relation is. It just depends on the context and what’s assumed to be relevant in that context. I’ll 
have more to say about this below. But, for now, I should just admit that I have nothing 
interesting to add to the existing literature on how to identify the relevant similarity relation in 
a given context.6 So, in the rest of the paper, I will just focus on cases in which I suspect there 
will be wide agreement as to what the relevant similarity relation is.  
As we’ve just seen, a central feature of an act with moral worth is that it is praiseworthy 
in virtue of its manifesting a set of pertinent motives/concerns that makes the agent’s having 
                                                        
6 But see the existing literature concerning similarity relations and each of the following: the counterfactual account 
of harm (e.g., Bradley /00Q), the counterfactual account of causation (e.g., Schaffer /000), and the truth conditions for 
counterfactuals (e.g., Lewis ,QR-). 
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acted rightly non-accidental.7 And, as we learned from the shopkeeper case, an act counts as 
merely accidentally right if it manifests a selfish motive given that such a motive would lead 
one to act wrongly in relevantly similar situations in which it’s not in one’s self-interest to act 
rightly.8 And, as we learned from The Dog-Lover, an act can count as merely accidentally right 
even if it stemmed from a good motive (e.g., a concern for the welfare of a dog) if that motive 
was, nevertheless, part of a set of pertinent concerns that would have led one to act wrongly in 
other relevantly similar situations. But we also learned both that it’s only the pertinent concerns 
that ma]er and that not all concerns are pertinent. Thus, Yunn’s act wouldn’t lack moral worth 
simply because she had a concern that Muslims not immigrate to the U.S., for this concern isn’t 
a pertinent one—at least, not in any obvious sort of context. Also, it’s important to realize that 
even the best motives can lead one to act wrongly when one is misinformed. So, what we’re 
really interested in is whether the agent’s pertinent concerns would ever lead her to act wrongly 
in a situation in which she is relevantly informed. And, so, we should adopt the following 
criterion for an act’s having moral worth.    
 
The Non-Accidentality Criterion: A right act has moral worth if and only if it manifests 
a set of pertinent concerns that would never lead its agent to act impermissibly in a 
situation in which she’s relevantly informed.9  
                                                        
7 There seems to be consensus on this point. See, for instance, Arpaly (/00/, p. //r), Herman (,Qs,, p. -tt), Isserow 
(Forthcoming), Johnson King (/0/0, p. ,Q/), Markovits (/0,0, pp. /0t & /,,), Singh (Forthcoming), and Sliwa (/0,t, 
pp. -Qr–-Qs).   
8 I’m assuming that, in every moral context, we’ll be concerned with whether an agent is fulfilling her moral duty 
only because doing so happens to align with her self-interest. And this, I think, is why there seems to be no 
disagreement concerning whether, in Kant’s example, the shopkeeper’s act of treating his customers honestly counts 
as merely accidentally right given that it was motivated solely out a concern for his own self-interest.  
9 In many instances, an agent will be led to acquire new knowledge out of a concern, say, for people’s safety. For 
instance, before handing a prop gun to an actor, a stage hand with such a concern would be led to determine whether 
it’s loaded with blanks or live ammunition. Of course, if the stage hand were fully informed, there would be no need 
for her to check the gun so as to acquire the knowledge that she already has. But if she’s relevantly (though not fully) 
informed, she would be led by such a concern to check the gun. So, given that being fully informed can affect what an 
agent ought to do even in the fact-relative sense of ‘ought’, I’ll be concerned with agents who are relevantly informed 
as opposed to fully informed.   
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With this criterion in hand, I plan, first, to assess various proposed accounts of moral 
worth and, second, to propose a new account. I’ll start by looking at two simple views. 
Although no contemporary philosopher accepts such a simple view, most contemporary views 
can be seen as more sophisticated versions of these two. Nonetheless, I believe that both views 
need more than mere revision, as I believe that both are fundamentally flawed. I’ll explain at the 
end of the next section what this fundamental flaw is. And this will lead me to introduce a new 
concept—the concept of an ultimate moral concern—in section -. I will then, in section O, 
employ this concept in developing a new account of moral worth and show how this account 
compares favorably to its rivals. Lastly, in section r, I conclude by explaining the extent to 
which this new account is and isn’t trivial.     
  
,. Two Opposing Accounts of Moral Worth: The Kantian View and the Humean View  
Most contemporary accounts of moral worth stem from the views of either David Hume or 
Immanuel Kant. I’ll present only the simplest version of each, and I make no claim as to their 
historical accuracy. My aim is merely to lay out the two most basic points of view from which 
most contemporary views have been developed. I’ll start with the view that’s been inspired by 
Kant and his thought that moral worth a]aches to right actions that are performed simply 
because they are right—i.e., actions motivated “from duty” or “from respect for the law” (G 
O:-Qt–O0,). This has inspired the following account of moral worth.   
  
The Kantian View: A right act has moral worth if and only if it manifests a non-
instrumental concern for performing acts that are right. In other words, assuming the 
Humean theory of motivation, a right act has moral worth if and only if its agent was 
motivated to perform it out of both a non-instrumental desire to do what’s right and the 
belief that were she to perform this act she would do what’s right. 
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Note that, on the Humean theory of motivation, an “agent A at t has a motivating reason 
to φ only if there is some ψ such that, at t, A desires to ψ and believes that were he to φ he 
would ψ” (Smith ,QsR, p. -R). I appeal to this theory in my formulations of these two simple 
accounts of moral worth, not because I think that it’s correct, but because its simplicity allows 
me to more perspicuously illustrate how these two views differ from each other. 
Now, there are some clear counterexamples to the Kantian View. Here’s one.  
 
The Empathic: A man named Christoforos believes that chimpanzees are not morally 
considerable beings, for he thinks that they can be neither harmed nor wronged. Yet, he 
finds himself empathizing with the apparent plight of a chimpanzee that has just been 
captured by poachers. Intellectually speaking, he doesn’t believe that there are any 
genuine feelings underlying the chimpanzee’s outward “signs” of distress. But, on an 
emotional level, he accurately perceives that the chimpanzee is in genuine distress. And, 
given these perceptions, he empathizes with the chimpanzee’s plight having once been 
held captive himself.10 So, when the opportunity arises, he’s moved to help the 
chimpanzee escape back into the wild out of a concern to alleviate the chimpanzee’s 
apparent distress. And this is his sole motive, for he doesn’t think that his helping the 
chimpanzee escape is the right thing to do. (Nor does he think that it’s the wrong thing 
to do.) Afterwards, he’s tempted to just walk away from the situation. Yet, he ends up 
reporting the poachers to the authorities out of both a concern for doing what’s right 
and the belief that reporting lawbreakers to the authorities is one’s duty. What’s more, 
                                                        
10 I believe that, through our emotional experiences, we can apprehend important truths. And these experiences 
provide us with evidence for these truths. What’s more, they can represent the world as being one way even while 
our avowed beliefs represent the world as being another way. And sometimes it’s our emotions rather than our 
avowed beliefs that accurately represent the way the world is. (See Furtak /0,s, especially chap. -.) That’s what I take 
to be going on with Christoforos. Through his empathic response to the apparent signs of the chimpanzee’s distress, 
he accurately represents the world as being one in which the chimpanzee is suffering, and yet, through his beliefs (or, 
at least, in terms of what he’s willing to assent to), he inaccurately represents the world as being one in which the 
chimpanzee is not suffering. Fortunately, his actions seem to be guided by what his emotions are telling him rather 
than by what his avowed beliefs are telling him.   
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he facilitates the authorities taking the poachers into custody safely by hiding their guns, 
and he does so out of a concern for the welfare of both the poachers and the authorities 
and despite knowing that this entails some added risk to himself.11   
 
On the Kantian View, Christoforos’s act of helping the chimpanzee escape back into the 
wild doesn’t have moral worth because it fails to manifest a non-instrumental concern for doing 
what’s right. Intuitively, though, it seems to have moral worth, for it seems to manifest an 
appropriate set of concerns—one that made his acting rightly in this situation non-accidental. 
After all, he had all the pertinent concerns: including a concern not only to alleviate the 
chimpanzee’s apparent distress, but also to safeguard the welfare of both the poachers and the 
authorities. And he even had a concern for doing what’s right. What’s more, the magnitude of 
each of his concerns was, we’ll stipulate, at the appropriate level. And, given all this, he would 
never be led to act wrongly by such a set of concerns in any situation in which he was relevantly 
informed. So, we should think that, contrary to what the Kantian View implies, his act of 
helping the chimpanzee has moral worth. Thus, the Kantian View violates the accidentality 
criterion and should be rejected.  
The other leading inspiration for accounts of moral worth is David Hume. According to 
Hume, “no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some 
motive to produce it, distinct from a sense of its morality” (T -./.,.R).12 This suggests the 
following account of moral worth. 
 
                                                        
11 More commonly, philosophers (such as Arpaly /00/) cite the case of Huck Finn as a putative counterexample to 
the Kantian View. I prefer this example, because it’s unclear whether Huck’s concerns are appropriate. For one might 
argue that Huck should have a greater concern for doing what’s right and/or a lesser concern for being loyal to a 
friend. And if Huck does, say, have too great a concern for being loyal to a friend, then he might be led by such a 
concern to act wrongly in other situations in which he’s relevantly informed. For instance, as Zoë Johnson King (/0/0, 
p. ,Qr) worries, Huck might be led by such a concern to help a friend elude the authorities even when that friend is a 
serial killer on the run rather than a fugitive slave.  
12 The ‘T’ refers to Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature and the citation is given by book, part, section, and paragraph 
number. 
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The Humean View: A right act has moral worth if and only if it manifests a non-
instrumental concern for performing acts that have some right-making feature RMF. In 
other words, assuming the Humean theory of motivation, a right act has moral worth if 
and only if the agent was motivated to perform it out of both a non-instrumental desire 
to perform an act that has RMF and the belief that were she to perform this act she 
would perform an act that has RMF.   
 
This view is also subject to counterexample, though what sort of counterexample its 
subject to depends on which of the following two versions of it we accept.  
On the fundamentalist version, RMF must refer to the act’s fundamental right-making 
feature. Thus, if maximizing act-utilitarianism is correct, ‘some right-making feature RMF’ must 
refer to ‘the feature of maximizing aggregate utility’.13 Given this view and the Humean theory 
of motivation, an act will have moral worth if and only if the agent is motivated to perform it 
out of both a non-instrumental desire to maximize aggregate utility and the belief that were she 
to perform this act she would maximize aggregate utility.  
On the non-fundamentalist version, by contrast, RMF can refer to any right-making 
feature, whether it’s fundamental or not. To illustrate, assume that maximizing act-
utilitarianism is correct and suppose that I would maximize aggregate utility if and only if I 
were to push the bu]on that’s in front of me, for pushing this bu]on is my only option for 
                                                        
13 Nomy Arpaly and Timonthy Schroeder seem to endorse the fundamentalist version of the Humean View. They 
hold that acting for the right reasons (which they equate with acting in a way that has moral worth) is just a ma]er of 
having intrinsic desires that are instances of good will. And they say that “for an intrinsic desire to be an instance of 
good or ill will the content of the desire must be something one has a pro tanto moral reason to do or avoid and this 
content must be presented by concepts that would allow the individual in question to trivially deduce that it is 
necessarily an instance of MAXIMIZING HAPPINESS, or RESPECTING PERSONS, or whatever the correct 
normative theory distinguishes as the right or good as a whole.” (/0,O, p. ,tR). Thus, as Arpaly explains in another 
work, “a morally worthy action stems from a commitment to the right and the good correctly conceptualized. If 
utilitarianism has the right account of the features that make actions right then the agent performing a morally 
worthy action conceives of her action as maximizing utility, and is commi]ed to maximizing utility so conceived” 
(/0,r, p. sR). 
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saving many lives. Also, for the sake of argument, assume that the Humean theory of 
motivation is correct. Given these assumptions, the non-fundamentalist version of the Humean 
View implies that my act of pushing the bu]on will have moral worth if I am motivated to 
perform it out of both a non-instrumental desire to maximize aggregate utility and the belief 
that were I to perform this act I would maximize aggregate utility. But it also implies that my 
act of pushing the bu]on will have moral worth if I am instead motivated to perform it out of 
both a non-instrumental desire to save many lives and the belief that were I to perform this act I 
would save many lives. For, in this instance, saving many lives is what would maximize 
aggregate utility. Thus, saving many lives is what makes my pushing the bu]on the right thing 
to do. It’s just that this is derivatively so. Thus, on the non-fundamentalist version of the 
Humean view, ‘some right-making feature RMF’ can refer to ‘the feature of maximizing 
aggregate utility’, ‘the feature of saving many lives’, or any other right-making feature.   
 Unfortunately, both versions of the Humean View are problematic. The problem with 
the non-fundamentalist version is that it gets the wrong result in cases like The Dog-Lover. For 
this version of the Humean View holds that Yunn’s act has moral worth given both that she had 
a non-instrumental concern to prevent the dog from ge]ing hurt and that this is what makes her 
blocking the boy’s kick with her own leg the right thing to do. Of course, it’s not what 
fundamentally makes it right. For assuming (merely for the sake of illustration) that 
maximizing act-utilitarianism is correct, what fundamentally makes it right to block the boy’s 
blow is that doing so would maximize aggregate utility.14 Nevertheless, that the act prevents 
the dog from ge]ing hurt is what derivatively makes it right given that preventing the dog from 
ge]ing hurt is what would maximize aggregate utility in the given situation. So, on the non-
fundamentalist version, Yunn’s act has moral worth. But, as we saw above, Yunn’s act is merely 
accidentally right given that she has zero concern for the boy’s welfare. And, thus, she would 
have shot the boy were that an option. Thus, the non-fundamentalist version of the Humean 
View violates the non-accidentality criterion and should be rejected.   
                                                        
14 I’m assuming that the boy’s blow would cause a lot more harm to the dog if not blocked by Yunn than it would 
cause to Yunn if blocked by her.  
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The reason the non-fundamentalist version of the Humean View violates the non-
accidentality criterion is that it fails to capture the counterfactual reliability that’s required for 
moral worth. Consequently, it allows that the set of concerns that you’ll be praising an agent for 
are ones that would lead her to act wrongly in other situations in which she is relevantly 
informed. This is because the only way to ensure counterfactual reliability is to look not only at 
the agent’s motivating reason and whether it was good, but also at whether the agent had all the 
other pertinent concerns and in the correct proportions. This is because whether an act is 
permissible depends not merely on whether it has some good feature (which might be the basis 
for an agent’s motivating reason for performing it), but also on whether it has any outweighing 
bad feature. Thus, doing something to protect a dog from a boy’s kick is permissible when it 
involves blocking that kick with one’s own leg, but not when it involves shooting him before his 
kick has a chance to connect. So, to ensure counterfactual reliability while adopting the Humean 
View, we must adopt the fundamentalist version of the Humean View. After all, it’s only a non-
instrumental concern to perform acts that have the fundamental right-maker that will ensure that 
one never does wrong when relevantly informed.  
 But the fundamentalist version of the Humean View is also unacceptable. The problem 
is that it makes moral worth too hard to come by. As Daniel Star has pointed out, people rarely 
conceptualize their actions as meeting some fundamental moral criterion.15 Even self-professed 
maximizing act-utilitarians rarely conceptualize what they’re doing as maximizing aggregate 
utility. And this is a good thing. Because there is, as Bernard Williams (,Qs,) has pointed out, 
something very wrong with someone who is, say, moved to kiss her partner out of a concern to 
maximize aggregate utility rather than simply as a result of her affection for her. What’s more, it 
seems that an act can have moral worth even if its agent wasn’t motivated by a non-
instrumental desire to do that which maximizes aggregate happiness and the belief that by 
acting this way she will maximize aggregate happiness (or, substitute here whatever the 
fundamental right-maker is). For it seems sufficient that she was motivated out an appropriate 
level of concern for the welfare of each of the sentient beings involved.   
                                                        
15 See Star (Forthcoming). See also Howard (Forthcoming).  
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In any case, The Empathic seems to be a clear counterexample to the fundamentalist 
version of the Humean View. Christoforos wasn’t motivated out a non-instrumental concern for 
anything such as maximizing aggregate utility, abiding by the ideal code of rules, or acting in 
accordance with the categorical imperative. Rather, he was motivated simply out of a desire to 
alleviate the chimpanzee’s apparent distress. What’s more, he had all the other pertinent 
concerns. For he cared about the welfare of both the poachers and the authorities. And he even 
cared about doing what’s right. He just didn’t have an additional concern for doing what would 
maximize aggregate utility, conceived as such. But caring about each individual and in the 
correct proportions (in, say, proportion to the amount of welfare that’s at stake for each of them) 
will unerringly lead him to maximize aggregate utility in any situation in which he is relevantly 
informed. Thus, we should reject the fundamentalist version of the Humean View, for it too 
violates the non-accidentality criterion.   
 So, we should reject both the Kantian View and the Humean View. We should reject the 
Kantian View because it gets the wrong answer in The Empathic. And we should reject the 
Humean View because it gets the wrong answer in either The Empathic or The Dog-Lover, 
depending on whether we’re considering its fundamentalist or non-fundamentalist version.16 
Now, there have been several a]empts to salvage some version of these two views. But I doubt 
that either can be salvaged, for they both go wrong in a very fundamental way. Specifically, 
they both go wrong in failing to acknowledge that all and only those right acts that manifest an 
appropriate set of concerns have moral worth.   
More specifically, the Kantian goes wrong in insisting that acts with moral worth must 
manifest a non-instrumental concern for doing what’s right, when, arguably, having a non-
instrumental concern for doing what’s right is inappropriate. For it seems that we shouldn’t care 
                                                        
16 Jessica Isserow (Forthcoming) has recently defended a pluralist proposal according to which “it is necessary and 
sufficient for an agent’s action to have moral worth that she be motivated either by the consideration that her action is 
morally right, or by the considerations that explain why her action is morally right.” I believe that her view will 
suffer the same fate as the Humean View, because either “the considerations that explain why the agent’s act is right” 
will refer exclusively to the act’s fundamental right-maker or it won’t. If it does, then it will get the wrong result in 
The Empathic. And if it doesn’t, then it will get the wrong result in The Dog-Lover.       
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about doing what’s right for its own sake. Rather, we should care about doing what’s right only 
as a means to doing right by whatever it is that we should ultimately care about. Nathan 
Howard (Forthcoming) makes the point nicely.  
 
Acting from a desire for rightness as such…is a li]le like desiring to get the cheap plastic trophy 
without caring about whether you’re the champion. The trophy is worth ge]ing only because it 
represents the verdict that you’re the champ. Therefore, desiring the cheap plastic trophy as such 
fetishizes the trophy; it displaces your desire from its fi]ing object, namely, the end of being the 
champ. Likewise for rightness. If rightness is worth caring about, it is only derivatively so, in virtue 
of its connection to the ends at which morality properly aims like equality, welfare, and the care 
that we owe to our friends, family, and fellow humans.  
 
And the Humean View goes wrong in denying that an act can have moral worth in 
virtue of manifesting an instrumental concern for doing what’s right, when, arguably, such a 
concern is entirely appropriate. For sometimes we either don’t know what we should ultimately 
care about or don’t know how to do right by that which we should ultimately care about. But 
we may, nevertheless, know what the right thing to do is—as a result of, say, the reliable 
testimony of someone who we can trust to know what’s right in such situations. And, in such 
instances, we should care about doing what’s right as a means to doing right by whatever it is 
that we should ultimately care about. Indeed, as Paulina Sliwa points out, “conative states with 
moral content (e.g., a desire to do what’s right) are essential for doing the right thing in the face 
of moral uncertainty” (/0,t, p. O0s). What’s more, there will be times when we are tempted to 
do wrong because we don’t directly care enough about what we should. And, in such cases, we 
can care about doing what’s right as a proxy for directly caring about what we should. Yet, 
according to the Humean View, an act has moral worth only if it manifests a non-instrumental 
concern for its right-making features, and an instrumental concern for an act’s being right isn’t 
the same as having a non-instrumental concern for its right-making features.  
So, as we’ve just seen, both the Kantian View and the Humean View fail to 
accommodate the plausible idea that all and only those right acts that manifest an appropriate 
set of concerns have moral worth, where the appropriateness of a concern—both in terms of its 
magnitude and in terms of its being either instrumental or non-instrumental—is determined by 
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what our ultimate moral concerns should be. The Kantian View fails in requiring us to have an 
inappropriate concern (that is, a non-instrumental concern for doing what’s right), and the 
Humean View fails in prohibiting us from having an appropriate concern (that is, an 
instrumental concern for doing what’s right). Of course, in making these arguments, I’ve relied 
heavily on the notion of what we should ultimately be concerned about. Unfortunately, this 
notion has been undertheorized. So, at this point, I will briefly digress from our discussion of 
moral worth to further explicate the notion. I’ll then, in the next section, show how we can 
exploit this notion to develop an account of moral worth that avoids the problems associated 
with both the Kantian View and the Humean View.       
 
@. Our Ultimate Moral Concerns  
A complete moral theory should provide us not only with accounts of both what’s right and 
what’s good, but also with an account what our ultimate moral concerns should be. Such an 
account would tell us what we morally ought ultimately to care about and, thus, what we 
morally ought to be ultimately aiming to achieve or, at least, what we morally ought to be 
hoping is achieved—and, if not by us, then by others. For one, the question of what we morally 
ought ultimately to care about is itself an important moral question and, thus, one that we 
should expect a complete moral theory to answer for us. For another, whether the ultimate 
moral concerns that a moral theory prescribes for us is consistent with our being motivated to 
do as its criterion of rightness directs us to act will determine whether that theory is incoherent—
incoherent in that its criterion of rightness sometimes permits (or, even worse, requires) agents 
to act in ways that they know won’t optimally advance the ultimate moral concerns that the 
theory prescribes to them. And this is important, because we should reject any theory that’s 
incoherent.   
To illustrate, consider the incoherence objection to rule-consequentialism. According to 
rule-consequentialism’s criterion of rightness, an act is morally permissible if and only if it 
accords with the ideal code of rules. Now, some have worried that the ideal code will be 
extensionally equivalent to act-consequentialism and that, therefore, rule-consequentialism will 
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collapse into act-consequentialism. But, as Brad Hooker (/000) has pointed out, rule-
consequentialism can avoid collapsing into act-consequentialism provided it holds that the ideal 
code is the one whose internalization by the overwhelming majority of everyone everywhere in 
each new generation would maximize the good. But, in avoiding the collapse worry, a new 
worry arises. For if the ideal code isn’t extensionally equivalent to act-consequentialism, then 
there will be instances in which rule-consequentialism permits (or even requires) an agent to 
abide by the ideal code although she knows that her doing so won’t maximize the good. And, 
so, if a complete version of rule-consequentialism holds both that agents must adopt 
maximizing the good as their ultimate moral concern and that agents are sometimes permi]ed 
(or even required) to abide by the ideal code even when they know that doing so won’t 
maximize the good, then it will be an incoherent theory in that it will sometimes require agents 
to act in ways that they know won’t optimally advance the ultimate moral concerns that the 
theory gives them. In other words, it will be incoherent in that it will require agents to have an 
incoherent set of motives. On the one hand, they will be required to internalize a set of 
motivations that will lead them to abide by the ideal code even when they know that doing so 
won’t maximize the good. And, on the other hand, they will be required to adopt maximizing 
the good as their ultimate moral concern, such that they will be concerned with abiding by the 
ideal code only as a means to maximizing the good. But if they’re concerned with abiding by the 
ideal code only as a means to maximizing the good, then they won’t be motivated, as required, 
to abide by the ideal code even when they know that doing so won’t maximize the good.  
Hooker’s response to the objection is to deny that a complete version of rule-
consequentialism must give each agent the ultimate moral concern of maximizing the good. He 
says, “rule-consequentialists need not have maximizing the good as their ultimate moral goal” 
(/000, p. ,0,). He holds that rule-consequentialism is itself commi]ed only to both a certain 
conception of the good (which tells us how to assess the goodness of various codes of rules) and 
a certain conception of the right (which tells us how to assess the rightness of acts in terms of 
the goodness of the various codes of rules that either permit or prohibit them), but not to any 
particular conception of what our ultimate moral concerns should be. So, Hooker, qua rule-
consequentialist, can deny that agents should have maximizing the good as their ultimate moral 
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concern and hold instead that they should have ensuring that their acts are impartially 
defensible as their ultimate moral concern.17 And that’s exactly what he does. What’s more, this 
allows him to avoid the incoherence objection, because there is nothing incoherent about a 
theory that holds both that agents should have acting only in ways that are impartially 
defensible as their ultimate moral concern and that agents should abide by the ideal code even 
when they know that doing so won’t maximize the good. For such a theorist can just claim that 
acting in accord with the ideal code ensures that one’s acts are impartially defensible even when 
those acts fail to maximize the good.  
So, it’s crucial that a complete moral theory tell us what our ultimate moral concerns 
should be so that we can then determine whether it’s incoherent. Now, admi]edly, most moral 
philosophers have ignored this aspect of moral theorizing. They have tended to be content 
merely to specify each theory’s criterion of rightness. Or if they go beyond that, they do so only 
to include a theory of the good, a theory of virtue, and/or a decision procedure. They (with, 
perhaps, Hooker being the singular exception) don’t specify what agents’ ultimate moral 
concerns should be. But this is clearly a mistake given that it’s not just rule-consequentialism 
that’s potentially subject to an incoherence objection. All theories are potentially subject to such 
an objection. Take, for instance, maximizing act-utilitarianism. It will be incoherent if it holds 
that agents should have an ultimate moral concern for ensuring that each sentient creature has 
as much utility as possible. To see why, note both that (,) maximizing act-utilitarianism holds 
that an act is permissible if and only if there is no alternative act that would produce a greater 
sum of utility than it would and that (/) although some infinities are, in some sense, larger than 
others, the sum of a denumerably infinite number of locations with / hedons each is not greater 
than the sum of an equal number of locations with , hedon each (see Kagan & Vallentyne ,QQR). 
Given these assumptions, maximizing act-utilitarianism implies that you would be permi]ed to 
φ and thereby provide an infinite number of sentient creatures with , hedon each even if you 
could instead have ψ-ed and thereby provided each of these creatures with instead / hedons 
                                                        
17 Perhaps, even this isn’t what our ultimate moral concern should be. For perhaps we should be concerned with our 
acts being impartially defensible only because we should be concerned to show respect for people’s humanity, which, 
perhaps, requires ensuring that we act only in ways that are impartially defensible.  
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each. Such a theory would be incoherent, because it permits you to act in a way that you know 
won’t optimally advance the ultimate moral concern that it gives them. For it permits you to φ 
even though you know that φ-ing won’t optimally advance the ultimate moral concern that you 
have for ensuring that each sentient creature has as much utility as possible.18       
Of course, some may doubt whether I’ve actually identified a new and important notion. 
For some may suspect that this notion is just equivalent to some more commonly discussed 
notion. For instance, some may suspect that what I’m calling “our ultimate moral concerns” is 
just equivalent to what Derek Parfit calls “our theory-given aims.” But, on Parfit’s view, our 
theory-given aims are provided by the theory’s criterion of rightness. Specifically, Parfit holds 
that our theory-given aims are just that our acts have those features that the criterion identifies 
as right-making and lacks those features that it identifies as wrong-making. Thus, Parfit says, 
“suppose that, on some theory, five kinds of act are totally forbidden. This theory gives to each 
of us the aim that he never acts in these five ways” (,QsO, p. -). Likewise, he claims that act-
consequentialism gives each of us the aim “that outcomes be as good as possible” (,QsO, p. /O). 
But our ultimate moral concerns needn’t be dictated by a theory’s criterion of rightness. For 
instance, on Hooker’s version of rule-consequentialism, agents should not have an ultimate 
moral concern for performing acts that are in accord with the ideal code. Rather, they should 
have an ultimate moral concern for performing acts that impartially defensible and, thus, care 
about abiding by the ideal code only as a means to ensuring that their acts are impartially 
defensible. So, what I’m calling “our ultimate moral concerns” is not what Parfit calls “our 
theory-given aims.”   
 The notion of an ultimate moral concern is also distinct from the notion of rightness. 
What it means for an act to be permissible is that an agent would not be blameworthy for 
responsibly performing it. But this needn’t be what an agent should ultimately care about. As 
                                                        
18 Interestingly, the maximizing act-utilitarian could borrow a play from Hooker’s playbook and claim that, qua 
maximizing act-utilitarians, they needn’t hold that agents should have an ultimate moral concern for ensuring that 
each sentient creature has as much utility as possible. They could, as Hooker does, hold that agents should instead 
have as their only ultimate moral concern that they ensure that their acts are impartially defensible and then hold 
that an act will be impartially defensible so long as there is no alternative that would produce a greater sum of utility.  
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we’ve seen, a complete moral theory, such as Hooker’s rule-consequentialism, may hold that 
what an agent should ultimately care about is whether her acts are impartially defensible rather 
than whether she would be blameworthy for responsibly performing them. Indeed, the la]er 
seems overly self-centered as far as an ultimate moral concern goes.  
Lastly, the notion of an ultimate moral concern is distinct from the notion of goodness. 
What it means for something to be good is for it be either be]er than some contextually 
supplied benchmark or be]er than a sufficient number of others in some contextually supplied 
comparison class (Schroeder /00s). And what it means for one thing to be]er than another is for 
it to be fi]ing for an impartial spectator to prefer it to the other (Suikkanen /00s). But it may be 
that an agent ought to care more about one thing than another even though it would be fi]ing 
for an impartial spectator to prefer that other to it. It may be, for instance, that what I should 
ultimately care about is that my acts are impartially defensible such that I should care more 
about refraining from performing even one indefensible act than about preventing you from 
performing two indefensible acts. Still, it could be fi]ing for an impartial spectator to prefer that 
I perform one indefensible act so as to prevent you from performing two indefensible acts. So, 
one’s ultimate moral concerns needn’t be dictated by what’s good, be]er, or best. 
We’ve seen, then, that the notion of an ultimate moral concern is distinct from various 
more commonly discussed notions such as the notions of what’s right and what’s good. Yet, as 
I’ve shown, the notion is crucial to moral theorizing, for we should reject theories that give an 
account of what our ultimate moral concerns should be that makes it incoherent. In the next 
section, I return to the issue of moral worth and show how this notions can also help us to 
develop a plausible alternative to both the Kantian View and the Humean View.  
 
C. The Concerns View and How It Compares to Its Rivals  
I can now state what I take to be the correct account of moral worth.    
 
The Concerns View: A right act has moral worth if and only if it manifests an 
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appropriate set of concerns—that is, a set that includes all pertinent concerns, each of 
which must be both qualitatively and quantitively appropriate, which in turn is a 
function of what the agent’s ultimate moral concerns should be.  
 
Remember that the pertinent concerns are all and only those that will (or would) determine 
whether the agent acts rightly in this and other relevantly similar situations—the relevantly 
similar situations being determined by the context. And whether a given concern is both 
qualitatively and quantitively appropriate is a function of what the agent’s ultimate moral 
concerns should be. To illustrate, suppose that acting rightly is not something that an agent 
should have an ultimate moral concern for. In that case, she should be concerned with acting 
rightly only insofar as acting rightly is a means to furthering that which she should have an 
ultimate moral concern for. And, thus, her concern for acting rightly will be qualitatively 
appropriate only if it’s instrumental as opposed to non-instrumental. What’s more, it will be 
quantitatively appropriate only if its magnitude is proportionate to the extent to which her 
acting rightly is, in the given situation, a means to her furthering that which she should have an 
ultimate moral concern for.  
To take another example, imagine that an agent should have an ultimate moral concern 
for promoting each existing individual’s utility (i.e., welfare) but not for promoting the overall 
sum of the utility in the universe. In that case, it would be inappropriate for her to care about 
promoting the overall sum except as a means to promoting the utility of existing individuals. 
Thus, it would be inappropriate for her to want to bring happy individuals into existence for the 
sake of increasing the overall sum of utility, but appropriate for her to want to do so as a means 
to promoting the utility of existing individuals, as where they would derive utility from our 
bringing these happy individuals into existence. Let’s further assume that this agent should care 
just as much about n hedons of utility for one individual as she does about n hedons of utility 
for any other individual. Thus, how intensely she should want to promote the utility of an 
existing individual by n hedons should depend on how great the number n is and not who that 
individual is.  
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Now that we have a sense of how an agent’s ultimate moral concerns determine the 
appropriateness of the set of concerns that her act manifests, we can look at how the Concerns 
View deals with various cases, starting with The Dog-Lover. On the Concerns View, Yunn’s act 
lacks moral worth given that she lacks a pertinent concern: a concern for the welfare of the boy. 
For it’s plausible to suppose that, for each sentient being, Yunn should have an ultimate concern 
for promoting that being’s welfare. Yet, she has zero concern for the boy’s welfare. What’s more, 
this concern is a pertinent one given that it would lead her to act wrongly in other the relevantly 
similar situations, such as the one in she has the option of shooting the boy. And since Yunn’s 
act of blocking the boy’s blow fails to manifest an appropriate set of concerns, the Concerns 
View rightly implies that it lacks moral worth. And there’s a lesson to be learned here.  
 
Lesson =: A right act can lack moral worth even if it was performed for the right reasons. 
 
After all, Yunn did perform the right act, and she did so for the right reasons (i.e., to 
protect the dog). Nevertheless, her act lacks moral worth, for it was merely fortuitous that she 
did the right thing. Had the situation been slightly different, she would have been led by the 
same set of concerns to have acted wrongly. And, thus, we should reject those rivals to the 
Concerns View that insist that moral worth is a ma]er of acting for the right reasons—views 
such as those defended by Howard (Forthcoming) and Markovits (/0,0, p. /0r).     
Let’s turn now to The Empathic. On the Concerns View, it’s not only Christoforos’s act of 
notifying the authorities, but also his act of helping the chimpanzee escape that has moral 
worth. Both have moral worth because both manifests an appropriate set of concerns. In 
notifying the authorities and hiding the guns, Christoforos manifests a concern (an instrumental 
concern) for doing what’s right as well as a concern (a non-instrumental concern) for promoting 
the welfare of each of the sentient beings involved. And these concerns are all quantitatively 
appropriate—or, so, I’ve stipulated. Likewise, his act of helping the chimpanzee escape 
manifests an appropriate set of concerns. Of course, it doesn’t manifest a concern for doing 
what’s right given that he doesn’t think helping the chimpanzee escape is right; he thinks, 
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rather, that it’s morally neutral. Nevertheless, his act does manifest an empathetic concern for 
alleviating the chimpanzee’s apparent distress. And this concern is entirely appropriate given 
that he should have an ultimate moral concern for the chimpanzee’s welfare and, thus, 
derivatively, for doing what would alleviate its apparent distress. So, in this case too, the 
Concerns View gets the intuitive verdict. What’s more, the Concerns Views provides us with 
another important lesson.  
 
Lesson >: An act can have moral worth even if it doesn’t manifest a concern for doing 
what’s right. 
         
Thus, we should reject those rivals to the Concerns View that insist that, for an act to have moral 
worth, it must manifest a concern for doing what’s right—views such as those defended by 
Herman (,Qs,), Johnson King (/0/0), Singh (Forthcoming), and Sliwa (/0,t).  
 Unlike the Kantian View, the Concerns View allows that an act can have moral worth 
even if it doesn’t manifest a concern (instrumental or non-instrumental) for doing what’s right. 
This is advantageous for two reasons. First, there are many instances in which one should not 
be moved by a concern for doing what’s right given that this would involve one thought too 
many. For instance, it would, as Michael Stocker has pointed out (,QRt, p. Ot-), be disturbing to 
learn that the agent was motivated to rescue a child out of a non-instrumental concern to do her 
duty rather than out of a concern for the child (see also Williams ,Qs,, p. ,s). Second, an agent 
whose sole or primary motive for rescuing a child is a non-instrumental concern for doing her 
duty seems to have a moral fetish. For, as Michael Smith has noted, “good people care non-
derivatively about honesty, the weal and woe of their children and friends, the well-being of 
their fellows, people ge]ing what they deserve, justice, equality, and the like, not just one thing: 
doing what they believe to be right, where this is read de dicto and not de re” (,QQO, p. Rr).  
The Concerns View not only allows that an act can have moral worth without 
manifesting a concern for doing what’s right, but it also allows that an act can have moral worth 
in virtue of manifesting a concern (an instrumental concern) for doing what’s right. This too is 
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advantageous, because such a concern is vital in dealing with moral uncertainty. Sometimes, we 
do not know what we should ultimately be concerned about. For instance, when it comes to 
promoting utility, we may not know whether we should have an ultimate moral concern only 
for promoting the overall sum of utility, or only for promoting the utility of each existing 
individual, or both. But if I were to know that I could trust someone to know that answer or at 
least trust that they know be]er than I do how to hedge one’s bets as to which of these ma]er, 
then I should follow her advice out of non-instrumental concern for doing what’s right. So, 
although there is something problematic about being motivated out a non-instrumental concern 
to do what’s right given that this seems fetishistic, there’s nothing problematic about being 
motivated by an instrumental concern to do what’s right. And, so, we derive yet another 
important lesson.  
 
Lesson ?: An act can have moral worth in virtue of its manifesting a non-instrumental 
concern for doing what’s right. 
 
And this means that we should reject rivals to the Concerns View that insist that an act can’t 
have moral worth in virtue of its manifesting a non-instrumental concern for doing what’s 
right—views such as those defended by Arpaly (/00/). 
Lastly, the Concerns View rightly implies that an act can have moral worth even if its 
agent believes that it’s wrong. And the case that philosophers typically appeal to in support of 
this contention is Huck Finn. I’ll begin, then, with Arpaly’s helpful description of the case.  
 
In Mark Twain’s The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, Huckleberry befriends Jim and helps him 
escape from slavery. While Huckleberry and Jim are together on their raft, Huckleberry is plagued 
by what he calls ‘conscience’. He believes, as everyone in his society ‘knows’, that helping a slave 
escape amounts to stealing, and stealing is wrong. He also believes that one should be helpful and 
loyal to one’s friends, but loyalty to friends is outweighed by some things, such as property rights, 
and does Miss Watson, Jim’s owner, not have property rights? Hoping to find some excuse not to 
turn Jim in, Huckleberry deliberates. He is not very good at abstract deliberation, and it never 
occurs to him to doubt what his society considers common sense. Thus, he fails to find a loophole. 
‘What has poor Miss Watson done to me’, he berates himself, ‘that I can see her nigger go away and 
say nothing at all?’ Having thus deliberated, Huckleberry resolves to turn Jim in, because it is ‘the 
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right thing’. But along comes a perfect opportunity, and he finds himself psychologically unable to 
do it. (/00/, p. //s) 
 
 Although this is perhaps as good a description based solely on Twain’s novel as we can 
get, it leaves a lot unclear. First, it remains unclear how much concern Huck has for various 
things that ma]er morally. For instance, it’s unclear whether Huck’s level of concern for being a 
loyal friend is out of proportion to how much moral concern he should have for the welfare of 
others. Consequently, people like Johnson King worry that even if Jim were a serial killer on the 
run rather than a fugitive slave, Huck would still find himself psychologically unable to turn 
him into authorities (/0/0, p. Qr). Second, it’s not clear whether Huck cares about what’s right or 
just about what’s ‘right’ in the inverted comma sense (Markovits /0,0, p. /0s, n. ,R). That is, it’s 
unclear whether he thinks that turning Jim is what’s genuinely right or is just what people in his 
society call ‘right’. Third, this description doesn’t tell us what sort of cases would count as 
relevantly similar to this one in assessing whether Huck’s act of helping Jim was merely 
accidentally right. Are the relevantly similar cases those in which Huck again recognizes 
something of moral worth that the other members of his society fail to recognize as having 
moral worth, or are they those cases in which Huck recognizes that someone has a genuine 
property right and ensuring that that property is returned to its rightful owner requires 
disloyalty to a friend. On the Concerns View, whether Huck’s act counts a merely accidentally 
right depends on what the context of our assessment is and what we take to be the relevantly 
similar cases in that context.  
So, based on the above description alone, I don’t think that we can adequately assess 
whether Huck’s act of helping Jim elude the authorities is one that has moral worth. I suggest, 
therefore, that we fill in the details ourselves. So, let’s assume that what motivates Huck to help 
Jim to elude the authorities is that Huck has come to see Jim as a fellow human being, and, 
consequently, he can’t stand the thought of Jim’s losing his rightful freedom. And let’s assume 
that what justifies Huck in helping Jim is the fact that Jim is a fellow human being who would 
lose his rightful freedom if caught by the authorities. What’s more, let’s assume that Huck cares, 
and cares in the right proportions, for all other relevant moral ma]ers. Thus, he cares more 
about protecting other people’s welfare from serial killers than about being loyal to a friend. 
 25 
And although he cares about people’s property rights being respected, he rightfully assesses 
that helping an autonomous being go free is more morally important than ensuring that Miss 
Watson has what many in her society see as her property returned to her. Assume also that 
Huck has an instrumental concern for doing what’s right, but that his non-instrumental concern 
for Jim and his freedom is rightfully greater than his instrumental concern for doing what’s 
right. Given these assumptions, the Concerns View implies that Huck’s act has moral worth. 
And this brings us to our fourth and final lesson.  
 
Lesson @: A right act can have moral worth even if its agent believes that it’s wrong. 
 
Of course, given that Huck believes that what he was doing was wrong, he clearly wasn’t 
motivated to help Jim out of a concern for doing what’s right. And this shows that we should 
reject rivals of the Concerns View that insist that an act can have moral worth only if its agent 
doesn’t believe it to be wrong—views such as those defended by Singh (Forthcoming) and Sliwa 
(/0,t).     
 So, it seems that Concerns View has clear advantages not only over both the Kantian 
View and the Humean View but also over all the contemporary descendants of those two views.   
 
G. Conclusion  
As I understand the notion, what it means for a right act to have moral worth is for it to 
manifest a set of pertinent concerns that would never lead its agent to act impermissibly in a 
situation in which she’s relevantly informed. And, of course, whether a set of concerns has this 
feature will just depend on whether it’s appropriate in a certain sense. This much is trivial. 
Thus, to say, as the Concerns View does, that a right act has moral worth if and only if it 
manifests an appropriate set of concerns is trivial. But the Concerns View, as developed here, 
goes well beyond this trivial statement. It tells us that the appropriate concerns must include all 
pertinent concerns, that which concerns are pertinent is determined by the context, and that the 
qualitatively and quantitively appropriateness of such concerns is determined by what the 
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agent’s ultimate moral concerns should be. And, so, the resulting account of moral worth—that 
is, the Concerns View—is far from trivial. Indeed, as we’ve seen, its implications are contrary to 
all the extant theories in the literature. Unlike the Humean View and its contemporary 
descendants (e.g., Markovits /0,0), it allows that a right act can lack moral worth even if it was 
performed for the right reasons. And, unlike the Kantian View and its contemporary 
descendants (e.g., Johnson King /0/0), it holds that an act can have moral worth even if it 
doesn’t manifest a concern for doing what’s right.19   
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